



PERFORMANCE-BASED DESIGN PROCEDURES: NOT YET VALIDATED

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Abstract

Performance-based design (PBD) is a term used to describe techniques that have been promoted as rational improvements -- relative to prescriptive codified procedures --- for evaluating and upgrading existing buildings, and for designing new buildings, to resist earthquake-induced ground motion. Recent examples of such procedures are included in ASCE/SEI 41-13 and the PEER Guidelines for Performance Based Seismic Design of Tall Buildings. No buildings designed by such procedures are known to have been field-verified by design-level earthquake shaking; thus, verification that PBD delivers reliable performance is limited to analysis procedures and laboratory testing. PBD remains, therefore, a hypothesis supported by engineering theory but not by empirics. Development of an empirical basis for PBD, even if indirect, is therefore essential before the built environment becomes chock-a-block with PBD structures, especially those with critical function and high occupancies. Example of indirect empirics include verification that PBD methods can retroactively predict damage to non-PBD structures during prior earthquakes or, yet more indirectly, success in blindly predicting damage to laboratory-shaken specimens.

Buildings that have been damaged by earthquake ground motion have been studied by many professionals including the authors, and by many professional groups in recent decades, primarily using methods whose specifics pre-date the publication of the most recent PBE procedures, but whose underlying concepts and analysis techniques remain in common use. These earlier studies demonstrate, however, that post-earthquake predictive studies regularly failed to match the observed damage, casting doubt on the use of these methods if reliability is the *raison d'être* for employing PBD methods. Logical questions we all should be asking ourselves are, “what justification exists for using PBD to design and assess other than its theoretical bases, and how sound are those bases?” The scope of this paper is to explore this subject from various perspectives with the goal of illuminating if PBD analysis procedures, as currently articulated in published standards and guidelines, are likely to meet with better success in predicting damage that will occur from strong ground motion than was possible earlier. Attention will be given to differences between various analysis/design procedures and tools; the influence of variations in ground motion, from recorded to design to actual ground motion at the building site, and to differences between as-built, as-analyzed and as-designed conditions.

Keywords: Performance-based design, response prediction, design uncertainty, as-built defects

1. Introduction

Over the years, the authors have consistently urged caution with regard to the growing application of formalized performance-based engineering (PBE) methods for design and assessment of important or significant structures. [1], [2], [3], [4] With the skylines of major cities in regions of high seismicity now beginning to be dominated by performance-based structures, which have, for all intents and purposes and for better or worse, “experimental” lateral force resisting systems, the need for caution has become quite urgent. Yet as the construction of performance-based structures is proliferating, the engineering profession appears to now be so enamored with the performance-based design (PBD) paradigm that it can neither remember its past nor see beyond the glare of PBD.

From its humble beginnings and through very recent times, structural engineering has been rooted in empirics. At its heart, structural engineering is applied empirics even more than it is applied science. Structural advances throughout the last millennium were largely founded on extending long-established precedent, essentially relying on past performance of what worked and what did not, i.e. empirically-derived proof-of-concept. This is especially true for structures whose primary role was to support gravity loads. Laboratory



testing, another avenue for deriving proofs-of-concept empirically wherein designed structural components or assemblages are subjected to controlled loading regimens and their behavior is observed and measured, became central to the advancement of engineering for gravity, wind and earthquake loading in the last century. Such laboratory experimentation is the backbone of empiricism that enabled, for example, the development of the diversity of structures and structural types on which twentieth century cities relied. Also in the last century, the study of structural performance in the aftermath of earthquakes, wherein the primary characteristics of the structures under scrutiny are more or less known but the loading to which they were subjected was uncontrolled, came to underlie the development of improvements in engineering and construction technology for earthquake resistance. Without question, empiricism is not just at the root of engineering, it is the thread from which the history of engineering is woven. Yet today, the earthquake engineering profession is rushing headlong away from empirics, the only proven means for establishing engineering truth to a reasonable degree of certainty. We continue to advise caution: when we stray from empirics, we stray into uncharted territory.

In fact, the “experimental” earthquake-resisting systems on which so many of today’s performance-based structures rely often have little or no empirical basis; they are theoretical constructs made real by investors, developers, engineers and contractors who, other than the engineers, are all largely unaware of the lack of empirical underpinning of those constructs. Outside of this inner circle, few know that the “experiment” that makes these structures truly “experimental” is expected to come long after they are constructed --- when they are at last subjected to a design-level earthquake shaking, long after the engineers responsible have left the scene. In this way, we are unfairly experimenting with the lives of the individuals who will occupy these structures as well as with the communities that rely on them --- communities whose planning and permitting-agencies are as seemingly enamored with derring-do and growth as they are ignorant of these structures’ lack of empirical underpinning. To make matters even worse, a disproportionate share of these skyline-dominating performance-based structures have high occupant loads and/or critical lifeline functions, like stadiums or bridges. While laboratory studies of the nonlinear behavior of some of the components of these systems under idealized conditions have been conducted in many cases, validation of system-wide performance of the majority of these has never been attempted in any laboratory, neither private nor public nor mother nature’s. It would be a stretch to characterize many of these systems as mere incremental steps built upon prior experience with similar proven strategies for earthquake resistance: many of these systems, since they do not resemble anything that has ever been relied on before to resist earthquakes, would be unrecognizable to most engineers practicing today and would have been beyond imaginable to nearly all of us 20 years ago. Under these circumstances, it is hard to argue that extra precaution is unmerited, yet to the authors’ perspective, extra precaution is being meted out in miniscule doses. What will it take to bring to the forefront of the PBD discussion that there is a chasm between what we are actually doing as a profession and what we say we are doing?

2. It is Imprudent to Insinuate That We Can Forecast How Our Buildings Will Respond to Future Large Earthquakes --- Five Reasons Why

2.1. *Reason One:* Published studies using common industry analysis methods routinely fail to generate reliable and accurate predictions of earthquake damage to real structures.

Over the decades, leading practitioners and researchers have conducted studies, in hindsight, to try to analytically post-predict damage that had actually occurred to real buildings during real earthquakes. [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], The goal of these studies was to see if damage that was observed to have occurred during an earthquake could have been predicted analytically with sufficient advance knowledge of the structure and with recordings of actual earthquake ground shaking and structural response. Because structural engineers are not prescient, we will never have such knowledge in advance of the design of any PBD structure, so these studies represent a better-than-best-case scenario with respect to the information available at the time of design. Design of a PBD structure requires engineers to be able to generate accurate blind predictions, not merely predictions in hindsight using data that does not exist during the design process.

One of the earliest recordings, the El Centro earthquake, was used as a basis for seismic “predictions” for many years until the San Fernando, Loma Prieta and Northridge earthquakes of 1971, 1989 and 1994 provided a



wealth of new recordings. Notable buildings that have been evaluated and published include the following: Imperial Service Building [10], Olive View Hospital [11], Holiday Inn [12], Oakland building [13], and similar buildings in three cities in Turkey [9], but numerous other published studies exist documenting attempts by academics and practitioners to predict real earthquake damage after-the-fact.

In essentially every one of these studies the computer analysis was not able to accurately corroborate the observed damage, although the primary damage mechanism and possible design defects were, in many cases, identifiable. Some promising results were achieved, for example, in one of the early published studies of the Van Nuys Holiday Inn during the San Fernando earthquake [12], but the promising aspects resulted only from iteratively generating and refining the analyses to achieve predictions that matched observations made after the earthquake. The iterative process was assisted by close examination of the recorded building response which revealed certain features of the building response characteristics that were not considered a priori. Specifically, in the first 4 seconds of the building's recorded response, a fundamental period shorter than had been calculated was indicated. When studied, it became apparent that this was due both to the structural model having neglected to account for nonstructural elements (e.g. stucco exterior walls) and to its having neglected portions of the structure as contributing to lateral stiffness (e.g. concrete slabs forming T-sections with the concrete beams that were considered part of the concrete frame lateral force system). In this instance, examination of the recorded response motion, which would of course not be available during development of a PBD structure, was necessary to identify the lapses in the model. Later in the record, a period shift that was deduced as having resulted from closing of a gap between infilled walls and structural concrete was noted. When these and other observations were taken into account, the analysis could be interpreted as generating predictions that were reasonably close to the observations, but this highlights that is very difficult to predict the actual performance of a building without having the actual ground motion and building response time histories.

The authors know of no published instance in which an a priori analysis of a building was able to generate results that closely matched damage generated by a prior earthquake, despite these published studies being generated by many of the leaders of the profession. More to the point, the studies most often employed structural analysis models that were assembled with reasonable care in a commercial engineering office that from time to time might be engaged in performance-based engineering design; thus, they are representative of what must be presumed to be the standard of care equal or exceeding that which would be exercised during the design of an important PBE structure. Each participant in these studies most typically had access to reasonable representations of the ground motions to which the actual structures had been subjected, with the ground motion input taken directly from nearby recorded motion being or developed by a leading seismologist specifically to translate recorded motions to the site of the buildings being studied, and the analytical methods employed were either those selected by the leading engineering professionals who were conducting the studies, or specific methods assigned by the studies' expert panels for the purpose of vetting state-of-the-art procedures. The studies employed the construction drawings for the building, often supplemented by field measurements and observations of the actual construction in the development of structural models. Most importantly, these studies had advance detailed knowledge of the actual behavior and damage to these structures as documented after the earthquakes. Gülkan's study outshines the others in its elegance in that its subjects were three nearly identical buildings in different parts of Turkey that had each been subjected to relatively intense ground shaking from three different earthquakes, and nearby recordings of ground motions from those earthquakes were available and used in the study, but still the accuracy of the predictions of even global performance left much to be desired. [9]

In short, none of these analytical studies accurately predicted the documented structural behavior of their subject buildings, thus failing the dispositive test of whether the profession is up to the task of predicting earthquake damage in real structures, either blindly or with full advance knowledge of the ground shaking input, the structural configuration and details, and the structure's response. To be clear, and fair, all of the studies referenced displayed some degree of predictive ability, but those abilities were always wanting. For example, in some cases the critical story levels were identified, but often not consistently, and the specific elements damaged most critically were rarely identified. However, as the engineering profession is prone to do, the outcomes were typically characterized in the studies themselves as "glass half full" success stories rather than "glass half empty" failures, though the predictive outcomes were often dismal.



Characterizations of this type suggest that as a profession we have lost sight of the big picture and strayed from our mission, which is to provide the public with earthquake-safe structures using only the predictive techniques embedded in the PBD process, which are profoundly limited with respect to their accuracy and reliability. While it is true that the poor predictive ability demonstrated by the cited studies sets before us an imperative to direct our intellectual might to improve the accuracy of our damage predictions, this situation also presents us with a moral dilemma. The question before us is not really whether the sanctioned methods (as employed in a practitioner's environment) are sufficiently robust to be able to proclaim that the methods have some modest predictive ability, but rather, whether we can morally justify building cities of gloriously architected and performance-based engineered structures --- all the while proclaiming that the structures and their occupants are earthquake-safe. If our designs are based on the same analysis methods as the studies cited, but are without benefit of the full advance knowledge that benefited the aforementioned studies (which themselves proved our inability to predict what had already happened), then how do we justify selling the false promise of earthquake safety that is embodied by the PBD paradigm?

2.2. Reason Two: Blind prediction contests are objective evidence of the failings of our predictive abilities

Over the past decade, blind prediction contests of a variety of structural types have been sponsored by a number of entities. In principle, blind prediction contests involve laboratory-built structures that are subjected to known excitation on a shake table. Prior to subjecting the structure to the excitation, the contest sponsors release all known relevant design parameters to the prospective expert prediction teams, including the time histories of the shake table motions that the structures will be subjected to. Although there have only been relatively few such contests whose results have been well-disseminated, these have been well-advertised and well-subscribed with a significant number of expert practitioners and academic teams participating. The expert teams have typically employed some of the most sophisticated seismic response prediction software available and predictive methods that are far more detailed than those typically employed in common design practice. It would therefore not be an overstatement to characterize these contests as representing the very best attempts at response prediction that the structural engineering profession can offer. It would also not be an overstatement to characterize these contests as the most objective measure available of our collective ability to predict seismic response since the participants have no opportunity to adjust their model to more closely match the performance of the laboratory specimen prior to submitting their predictions. The contests are truly blind and in the sense that they are focused on predicting performance before the fact, they simulate the design profession's real assignment. They are, of course, also far simpler than what the design profession is charged with because the specific input motion is known in advance, the construction quality of the test specimen is more tightly controlled than for structures built for commercial purposes, the material properties of the test specimen are known in detail, and in some contests, there are no nonstructural interactions that need to be considered because the structures are bare. Moreover, the structures are far simpler and far more regular than is the vast majority of commercial-purpose structures.

Two of the better publicized blind prediction studies were organized by the Pacific Earthquake Engineering Research Center (PEER) in 2010 and by the E-Defense Steel Building Project in 2007. [14], [15], [16], In the PEER contest, a single full-scale reinforced concrete bridge column was subjected to six consecutive unidirectional ground motions and forty-one teams from fourteen different countries using 12 different analysis engines participated, with 17 of the teams registered as professional engineers and the balance registered as researchers. In the E-Defense contest, a full-scale regular four-story building with composite floors and a reinforced concrete roof deck was subjected to scaled time histories of the Takatori record from the 1995 Kobe Earthquake and many analysis teams, including an academic team in Pavia, attempted to predict the structure's behavior both with and without the test results.

In the PEER contest, there was wide dispersion in the results that varied according to the parameter being tracked. Predictions of displacement were significantly biased on the low side relative to the experimental results while predictions of response acceleration were significantly biased on the high side. (Fig. 1) These prediction errors suggest that nearly all the participants significantly underestimated damage and nonlinear response, which is particularly strong evidence of why performance-based engineering is more myth than reality.




Figure 4.4 Predictions of “Max” displacement at the top of the column versus measured response.




Figure 4.6 Predictions of “Max” acceleration at the top of the column versus measured response.

Figure 1 - Plots of predicted maximum displacement (left) and maximum acceleration (right) at the top of the column for each earthquake in the PEER contest (from [14]).

Dismayingly with respect to PBE, residual displacement at the end of each ground motion was found to not be predicted with an acceptable degree of accuracy and had the greatest dispersion compared to all other response quantities, with the mean bias for the majority of the earthquakes exceeding 40 percent (Fig. 2). The mean predictions for residual displacement were consistently lower than the experimentally measured residual displacement. Residual displacement being one of the best quantities for characterizing performance, this indicates a poor ability of the best in our field to predict performance even of a single-degree of freedom system.




Figure 2 - Plot of predicted residual displacement at the top of the column after each earthquake in the PEER contest (from [14]).

In the E-defense test, submissions were accepted from 47 analysis teams, consisting of 30 researchers and 17 practicing engineers. One submission was based on a structural analysis model developed by a team at Instituto Universitario di Studi Superiori di Pavia considering all relevant data developed prior to the shake table testing. When the model was analyzed and the results compared to the shake table test result, the analysis results were found to poorly represent the testing of the physical structure, with errors more than 100 percent. (Table 1)



Table 1 - Error evaluation in predicting relative displacements in different analyses (from [15]).

TEST	LEVEL	Displ. NS (mm)	error %	Displ. EW (mm)	error %
MEASURED	1 (GL)	0		0	
	2	75		47	
	3	135		95	
	4	177		134	
	5 (Roof)	200		157	
PRE TEST	1	0		0	
	2	128	71%	105	123%
	3	218	61%	185	95%
	4	282	59%	247	84%
	5	321	61%	292	86%
POST TEST	1	0		0	
	2	171	128%	114	143%
	3	259	92%	175	84%
	4	329	86%	232	73%
	5	373	87%	272	73%

The rest of the contest participants did not fare much better. In producing their results summary, the organizers of the contest removed “exceptional” data that was “obviously wrong” in order to produce useful statistics; this resulted in almost 13 percent of the results for certain parameters (e.g., overturning moment) being discarded offhand, an inauspicious start. Despite this culling of real participants’ responses, the results are still appallingly dispersed. For example, the interstory drift angle has a mean, maximum, and minimum RMS of 1.36, 4.39, and 0.192, respectively, which suggests that each analysis is nothing more than a mathematics-based guess. This blind prediction study and others like it provide incredibly compelling evidence that we should not be pretending that the analysis results we generate via PBE methods correctly simulate the interaction between engineered structures and earthquakes. Rather, the necessity for physical validation of a hypothesis prior to it being declared to be factual is one of the first lessons taught in any fundamentals course in science, but today’s engineers have prematurely proclaimed PBE analysis tools to be sufficiently predictive for design, selling a “dream” to the general public and profiting handsomely while not letting on that as a profession we are not capable of accurately or reliably predicting performance of even simple structures with known ground motions *a priori*.

2.3. Reason Three: Demand side uncertainty makes for bad science

Like most other phenomena of nature, no two earthquakes, past or present, are exactly the same. Each earthquake involves a portion of a fault interface violently releasing energy and shaking the ground in a distinct way. Nonlinear time history analysis conducted under the PBE umbrella has typically involved subjecting a building to no fewer than seven different ground motions that are loosely derived from some previously recorded event on a faraway fault. Thus, in the exercise of PBE, structures are assessed and designed for ground motions that they are guaranteed to never experience. We do not suggest that this nod to experiential engineering is entirely misplaced; it is possible to learn a great deal about a building by analyzing its response to ground shaking that corresponds in some probabilistic sense to site seismicity. The flaw is that while this process may well reveal much about the structure that is relevant, it also may well leave the structure with a critical inestimable vulnerability to the actual ground shaking that will eventually occur -- which is not how PBE is being sold to society. The proposition that we can design structures to specific performance targets with great confidence (at least 90 percent confidence to be precise) when, for example, we are relying on analytical models that are subjected to a handful of ground motions having no known relationship to the design event that may actually occur, and when that handful of motions may simply be relatively small ground motion recordings that have been scaled up and adjusted to the analytically-derived building period, would not pass as good science in any other field. [17] However, the industry has plowed ahead with implementing a methodology that is not yet ready for “prime time”, assuring those outside the industry that designs created using ground motions that have been scaled, matched, and synthesized will be safe in large earthquakes when they really do not know.



Examples of the hubris that underlies ground motion prediction and probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA) as a whole abound in recent history. The 2010 Darfield Earthquake, with a moment magnitude of 7.1, roughly realized the New Zealand Standard (NZS) design spectral acceleration demands for downtown Christchurch and the 2011 Lyttleton Earthquake, with a moment magnitude of 6.2 significantly exceeded the NZS spectral acceleration for the “maximum considered earthquake,” or 2,475-year event, as seen in Fig. 3 (i.e., the design earthquake and more than 1.5 times the design earthquake, respectively). That these two allegedly rare events occurred only five months apart on previously-unknown fault structures should give us all pause. [18] In addition, many other modern events, such as the 1994 Northridge earthquake also occurred on previously “blind”, or unknown fault segments, which is problematic, due to the necessity of identifying all contributing seismicity sources if the PSHA methodology is to have any validity. It is not as though earth scientists are simply putting the finishing touches on a database of the characteristics of all seismic structures in existence - they are still discovering sources of earthquakes all the time, as well as earthquakes with characteristics never before observed. The uncertainty associated with this evolving understanding of seismicity does not go away simply because the engineering community chooses to assume that the inputs to their design process are known, and to characterize their performance-based designs as earthquake-safe even knowing that the demand side of the equation is at best incomplete. If we are going to represent seismicity and structural performance probabilistically, and tell the world that our methods are sufficiently robust that we have reduced the uncertainty with respect to our ability to design earthquake-safe structures to an acceptable level, we would do well recognize both the underlying fallacy of the approach and the plain meaning of the word uncertainty. We cannot fairly represent to the general public that we can quantify uncertainty for data sets of unknown size and characteristics, regardless of what the statisticians tell us.




Figure 3 - Geometric mean recorded ground motion spectra for the September 2010 event (left) and February 2011 event (right) relative to the New Zealand Standard 1170.5 500-year return period design spectrum (the black dashed lines) (from [18]).

The cornerstone of the state-of-the-art of PSHA, the NGA West 2 Ground Motion Prediction Equations (GMPE), were developed as regressions of more than 21,000 acceleration response spectra of recorded ground motions. However, nearly 40 percent of these spectra have been found to not reflect rational ground shaking properties: namely, the spectra do not asymptotically approach the peak ground displacement at very long periods as they should --- if we agree that basic structural mechanics must be satisfied. [19] As a result, the industry’s latest-and-greatest means of selecting ground motions is based on a flawed population of ground motions, which relegates all nonlinear time-history analyses conducted under the umbrella of PBE to a “garbage in-garbage out” reality. As a result, these widely-used GMPEs generate spectral velocities and displacements that fail to match the basic physics of the problem, so how can we expect them to generate realistic predictions of earthquake response.

For the vast majority of design engineers, ground motion acceleration time histories are an abstraction and something handed to them by the geotechnical engineer on their project. This is less true for PBE designers, but



they too exhibit a lack of critical introspection regarding ground motions themselves (and seismic hazard issues in general) that would certainly give an outside-the-industry stakeholder pause --- if only they knew and understood what is common in our industry. For instance, peak ground displacements (PGD) in near-fault zones are significantly biased by common signal processing techniques: this bias can create a PGD ratio of two-to-one between unprocessed and processed records, respectively. [20] Even more alarming to the authors is the abject neglect of peak ground velocity (PGV) and PGD within the PSHA methodology which is beholden only to PGA. Even where PGV and PGD are the ground motion parameters of greatest structural concern, ground velocity and displacement demands are merely byproducts of the methodology, single and double integrals of ground acceleration, rather than drivers of the ground motion selection process. The fundamental flaw is that PSHA-based ground motion selection is rooted in the assumption that PGA, PGV and PGD have similar relationships to earthquake magnitude, but this assumption is demonstrably false. There is little correlation between PGA and PGD for large magnitude earthquakes at near-source locations; while PGA saturates with magnitude, PGD does not. In essence, there is a great deal more uncertainty associated with predicting PGD for near-fault sites than PGA. [21] The authors are greatly concerned that the buildings most affected by large ground displacements are long-period, near-source structures, like high-rises and seismically-isolated structures in cities with nearby faults, and this same inventory of structures is the most likely to be designed under the PBD paradigm.

In sum, we believe that the myriad sources of seismic demand uncertainty, which are only broached in passing above, present a “non-starter” obstacle to the representation that engineers are today able to develop accurate quantifications of seismic risk and structural performance, the underlying philosophy of PBD.

2.4. *Reason Four*: Embracing the absurdity of it all - different answers mean no one really knows

The engineering profession is obsessed with analysis-based numerical simulations, employing them as surrogates for empirical evidence at every turn. The reason is obvious: there is a dearth of empirical data on the actual performance of structures designed using performance-based methods during strong earthquake shaking, so no one really knows how any performance-based building will perform. Simulations are our only recourse, the only feasible, cost-effective alternative available. But the absence of empirical data and the feasibility of conducting analyses does not justify the construction and occupancy of cities whose premise of earthquake safety is founded almost entirely on simulations. We now develop the designs for the grandest most daring structures ever built by relying entirely on simulations, then we validate that those designs will work using simulations. Then we peer review them, sometimes using more simulations. Yet the one proven element in all of this is that simulations are neither accurate nor good predictors of performance, even when we know the outcome. It sometimes seems that the old twentieth century saying, “Better living through chemistry” has been transmuted by engineers in the twenty-first century to “Better living through simulations”. It was a sales pitch then and it remains a sales pitch now. Unfortunately, the engineering profession has swallowed its own kool-aid.

The nature of the problem should be readily apparent to anyone who is looking, anyone who cares to look. In the US, ASCE 41 has become the de facto standard for performance-based assessment and design and the PEER Tall Buildings guidelines are now referenced regularly for the design of tall buildings in regions of high-seismicity on the west coast. [22], [23] Other design guidelines like the Los Angeles Tall Buildings procedure are accepted in Los Angeles. [24] Each of these documents sets forth different “rules” for simulation performance and thus for validation that a design is appropriately earthquake-safe. ASCE-41 itself sets forth four different analytical methods. Eurocode 8 as well allows for a suite of analysis methods to be used. [25] Obviously, none of these methods could be expected to generate precisely the same predictions of behavior for any specific building, and practitioners well-versed in the use of these documents know that they do not. In the discussion below, we focus on this issue at several levels: document-to-document methodological disparities; assessment technique-to-assessment technique disparities within each document; modeling technique-to-modeling technique disparities between the users of the methodologies and assessment techniques; and analysis software-to-analysis software disparities between different analysis engines in common use across the globe.

At its simplest, it should be clear that each of these documents sets forth similar methodologies, though there are clear differences between them. Indeed, there would be no need for these different documents if the methodologies were precisely the same. The differences in the methodologies are significant enough, or thought



to be by the various groups that authored these various documents, that there is regular professional tussling over the various provisions, and it might be said that a friendly competition exists between some of them. Moreover, to some degree, the documents fill different niches and are not interchangeable. While ASCE-41 is taken to have general purpose applicability, PEER is defined for tall buildings only. Yet PEER is not simply an excerpt from ASCE-41; it has provisions in it that its authors believe are especially needed to accurately assess and design tall buildings for earthquake resistance. How is the profession to reconcile this? Is it appropriate to use ASCE-41 for assessment and design of very tall buildings, or is it not? What is the added risk to society of using one of these documents over another? Does one of the documents really produce “better” assessments and designs? Returning to our theme, it is clear that these questions are all rhetorical because we will never be able to answer them until the big experiment takes place when a city full of function-critical structures designed using these various documents is subjected to strong earthquake shaking.

As one strong indication that our profession is blindly plowing ahead with design of function-critical structures without paying heed to the most obvious analytical limitations and their lack of readiness for prime-time, one only needs to examine the findings of researchers and professionals who have studied and compared damage predictions generated by various assessment techniques, as well as the findings of other researchers and professionals who studied and compared damage predictions generated by the same assessment techniques. [5], [8] We view their findings to be nothing short terrifying. As only one example and as summarized in FEMA 440, various researchers have reported that one commonly used nonlinear analysis technique set forth in ASCE-41, the Capacity Spectrum Method (CSM) overestimates displacement response --- while other researchers have found that it underestimates response. [26], [27] How can it be that researchers cannot even agree as to whether an assessment method employed worldwide overestimates or underestimates response? This inconsistency is not an indictment of CSM but rather is an indictment of the ability of engineering research community even to be able to competently evaluate the efficacy of one of its sanctioned performance-based analysis methods. If in assessing CSM we cannot even achieve a consensus as to whether it generates overly conservative or under conservative estimates of building displacement response, what business have we designing structures using any performance-based method?

Assessment technique-to-assessment technique disparities that exist within each of the cited published documents are also an issue. The techniques within each document typically extend across a wide range of complexities from linear static to nonlinear dynamic. One need not ask if these different techniques would produce different designs or different results when a given structure is being assessed for adequacy; we all know they produce inconsistent predictions of performance, so few in the structural engineering world would bother to ask. Indeed, how could a linear dynamic method or a nonlinear static method generate the same results as a nonlinear dynamic analysis method? If either did, no one would ever opt to undertake the more expensive, more time-consuming analysis types. To explain the fact that each method yields different answers, most professionals will argue that the linear methods are merely “more conservative”, but this is a cheap out that projects an air of confidence when none of us really knows if either method will generate reliable predictions of performance when it is applied to a system that has never been field-tested. Who among us can state for certain that the results of the nonlinear dynamic technique are conservative enough when the seismic systems that are being analyzed have never been field-tested?

Modeling technique-to-modeling technique disparities between the users of the various methodologies and assessment techniques and analysis software-to-analysis software disparities between different analysis engines in common use across the globe also create a quandary for anyone examining this issue. Simply put, practitioners executing the most state-of-the-art methods at their disposal, in circumstances where cost is virtually no object, generate radically dissimilar predictions of performance. The dissimilarities are often not trivial; they rise to the level of life-and-death level significance, for hundreds if not thousands of future occupants. For example, a high-rise reinforced concrete shear wall building in Las Vegas was partially constructed (to the 26th floor out of a design height of 48 stories), but when the global financial crisis occurred and defects in the as-built reinforcement were identified, construction was abruptly terminated. The building was intended for mixed use: hotel, condominium and casino. After the work stoppage, numerous expert teams were retained to study the building and its seismic adequacy, both in its 26-story as-built condition and in its intended 48-story configuration. These experts spanned the structural engineering industry, including well-known



practitioners and academics. Many are luminaries in the development of codes and standards pertaining to earthquake engineering and many played prominent roles in the development of the performance-based methodologies mentioned above. Their simulations all relied on nonlinear dynamic simulation methods and all used software, such as PERFORM® 3-D, which is widely recognized as an industry-leading performance-based analysis tool. Some used ASCE-41, some used the PEER Tall Buildings Guidelines and some used the Los Angeles Tall Buildings document. The breadth of the predictions generated from these simulations was staggering and ranged from total collapse, including collateral damage to adjacent structures from the collapse, to modest damage that would normally fall well-within expectations for engineered structures subjected to a design event. Some experts' simulations led them to recommend complete and immediate demolition of the building while other argued that virtually nothing needed to be done except to correct some localized weaknesses. Even understanding that these experts were representing different parties, their simulations all relied on the same basic model geometries and material strengths, and all could be tied to modelling methods supported by the documents and guidelines on which each simulation was based. At a minimum, the scatter in these results should give pause to all who promote performance-based engineering methods as a methodology that reduces the uncertainty of the outcome to tolerable levels.

2.5. *Reason Five:* As-built conditions can matter as much to performance as how the building was designed

Too few design engineers spend enough time in the field to develop a practical understanding of how the realities of normal construction practice influence the as-built condition of the buildings we design. Based on the authors' collective experience over many decades investigating existing construction, the reality is that deviations from design conditions occur regularly, even for standard construction in which nearly everyone involved on-site has appropriate qualifications and has extensive experience with the construction type specified by the design. In these situations, serious deviations are more likely to be caught and addressed before the deviations are covered up, but compromises are regularly made nonetheless and the quality and earthquake-resistance of the construction can suffer. As anyone who has participated in post-earthquake reconnaissance can attest to, earthquakes often find such deviations and take advantage of them. It is not at all unusual for earthquake damage to concentrate where deviations from the original construction details are present.

When structures are designed by performance-based methods, their as-constructed condition can be far more critical than for traditionally designed structures. Unfortunately, in our experience, the checks and balances long-established for ensuring that construction quality matches the designer's expectations are not always appropriate to performance-based designs --- particularly when the construction includes rarely-used materials and methods, novel applications, or anything out-of-the-ordinary like the use of specialized non-destructive test equipment for conditions for which there is generally less experience in the construction industry.

Checks and balances that have historically provided for adequate quality for routine construction include the past experience of the contractors and their staff; the fact that inspection and testing requirements for routine construction methodologies and assemblies are standardized and have been developed to catch routine problems; the ability of special inspection staff functioning on auto-pilot to identify more obvious conditions that do not conform to the project requirements; and the fact that it takes relatively little training for engineering staff assigned to observe routine field work on routine projects to come up to speed, even though the staff assigned tend to be among the least experienced available, with field observation often being used as training ground for entry level staff. But these historically reasonable checks and balances are grossly inadequate for large classes of PBD projects.

For example, structural drawings and specifications are not typically developed to control construction means and methods for common construction types, but construction means and methods can affect the construction outcomes of performance-based designs considerably. The issue is much deeper than contractors having little or sometimes no experience with the specialty systems the engineers might specify and the special efforts needed to attain the required construction quality. Contractors usually have no way to know or consider that a structure is performance-based during the bid phase of a project and have no way to estimate the level of effort actually required to achieve what the engineer is seeking and incorporate that into their bid and schedule. They can only bid based on their experience with similar projects, which may not be very similar at all when



performance-based designs are relatively novel. Once costs are set by competitive bid, contractors are often unwilling to adjust their level of effort if extra effort will go uncompensated. Schedule incentives also contribute to contractor resistance to adjusting their schedule substantially. As importantly, the need for increased effort has to be discovered before the project is too far along, or problems run the risk of being swept under the rug.

While it is often left to the engineer to discover that the contractor may not be devoting appropriate attention to the make-or-break aspects of the design, engineers often do not spend enough time on-site to become familiar with critical aspects of construction, and lack of familiarity with construction means and methods render many engineers unqualified to recognize problems in the making. Also, because engineering staff who had little or nothing to do with the design are often assigned to do “field observation”, critical construction deficiencies tend to go unnoticed and uncorrected. In short, while field staff may be exceptionally well-suited to ordinary construction, they are usually the least well-suited to identify problems in specialty construction.

Special inspection services and nondestructive testing technicians may also understand what works for standard designs and standard construction, but the special needs of performance-based designs are normally not communicated to special inspection staff and even when the special needs are communicated, special inspection staff tends to be ill-equipped to deal with it, or turns over their staff too often, resulting in loss of critical information along the way.

The authors have frequently investigated problems during construction that have developed in major performance-based engineering projects, and found the lack of readiness of entire design, construction and QA/QC teams to deal with novel performance-based features of design to be frightening. What is frightening is not that the “paperwork” on these projects is not generally in order, but rather that despite the surface appearance of order and the conformance to normal protocols, the constructed product sometimes misses the boat in every way imaginable. For example, we have found that the engineering drawings for novel designs are sometimes lacking the specificity to communicate the design requirements unequivocally; the specifications are sometimes missing requisite information to ensure that the contractors provide appropriate construction materials and install them appropriately; inspection staff can sometimes be woefully ill-informed about the critical aspects of the construction of performance-based elements that they should be looking for; engineering staff is sometimes sufficiently unfamiliar with the QA/QC methodologies being used that they cannot assess them correctly, and project communications are too often focused on schedule concerns rather than building things correctly. As a result, the engineering and construction management systems and controls developed to successfully and profitably execute construction projects that employ only routine designs and construction methodologies at times appears to be unsuitable for adaptation to performance-based designs.

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