

CHARACTERISTICS OF NETWORK RELIABILITY OF VARIOUS  
TYPES OF LIFE-LINE SYSTEMS

by

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SUMMARY

Study of the past damage to functions of lifeline due to earthquakes in Japan, indicates that the disorder of functions of lifeline happened more easily in a wider area than the damaged area of buildings. The author made seismic reliability analysis about simple models of several lifeline such as electric power, water, telephone, and railway by means of Monte Carlo simulation and variated stochastic values of system components, for example, maximum value, average value of  $P_i$ , etc., and obtained the correlation between the reliability of the system and the above stochastic parameters of components.

INTRODUCTION

It is well known that the function of Electricity, Water, Gas supply systems was stopped by San Fernando Earthquake of 1971. In Japan we suffered almost same functional disorder on Electricity, Gas, Transportation by Miyagiken Oki Earthquake 1978 as in San Fernando, USA. Functional disorder of lifeline utilities did not draw so much interest of earthquake engineer before San Fernando Earthquake. The out of order on lifeline occurred frequently in past earthquakes, however, in case of severe earthquakes, many buildings were destroyed and many lives of citizens were lost, and people did not pay so much attention to lifeline. Furthermore, in olden times, people does not enjoy so convenient life as the present one in a large city, and they did not have water supply system, telephone, gas distribution systems to individual home, various types of electric and electronic equipments in each house, therefore, stoppage of lifeline function can not have a fatal effect on citizens. At present, wells changed to water transmission system, firewood changed to gas for fuel, and fire fighting with various machines in stead of firemen, therefore, stoppage of lifeline due to earthquakes causes to be vital for lives of citizens. The author describes in the following chapters the outlines of functional damage to lifeline in

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Miyagiken-Oki earthquake which is one of the typical damage occurred to lifelines recently in Japan, and weakness of functions against earthquake and its assumed causes, and seismic reliability analysis on lifeline network models varying stochastic parameters such as maximum value of probability of failure  $P_i$  of network component, average value of  $P_i$ , etc..

#### DAMAGE ON LIFELINES IN MIYAGIKEN-OKI EARTHQUAKE OF 1978

In Miyagiken-Oki earthquake of 1978 in Japan, disorder of lifeline utilities occurred easily and extensively in a wider area than a region which buildings were damaged. In this earthquake, the maximum acceleration on the ground surface of Sendai city which is located in the center of damaged area approximately 100 km west from the epicenter, was 250-300 gals, and houses less than 1 percent were severely damaged. Therefore, it can be said, the earthquake was not so intense, however, the function of lifeline was as follows.

i) Electricity

Electricity supply was stopped about one day due to damages to facilities indicated in Table.1. Electricity can not be continued to supply owing to the fear of danger to citizens such as electric shock, and fire, after cut of wire. This causes frequent stoppage of electricity supply during earthquakes.

ii) Water supply

Water supply was partly impossible for several days due to leakage of water caused from damage to underground pipes which were frequently seen in the border between soft and hard ground.

iii) Railway Traffic

Railway was forced to stop for maximum three weeks in some region. The damage of several structures occurred in local region such as horizontal cut of bridge piers and slight settlement of embankment, caused stoppage of railway traffic in a wide area for a long time. The difference between the facts that trains can not go even on the slightly deformed rail and cars can go on a little damaged pavement, produced the difference of their responses to Miyagiken-Oki earthquake.

iv) Road Traffic

Road traffic was thrown into confusion after the earthquake due to disorder of traffic signals ( 74% of total ) caused from electricity stoppage, damage of bridges, settlement of road embankments, water flood on the road from leakage of underground water transmission pipe. Traffic confusion was escalated by concentration to road traffic of train commuters.

v) Gas

Many damages occurred to joint parts of small transmission underground pipes and caused leakage of gas, however, main steel pipes in large diameter were subjected almost no damage. One gas holder suffered collapse and got fire. Gas factory with good automation could not produce gas due to stoppage of electricity. Gas supply must be stopped in case of leakage, therefore, it took approximately one month to serve to users again.

## WEAKNESS OF FUNCTION OF LIFELINE UTILITIES AGAINST EARTHQUAKES

According to survey of damages to structures and lifeline utilities in Miyagiken-Oki earthquake of 1978, although the intensity of the earthquake was not so severe and gave only slight damage to ordinary buildings, disorder of function of lifeline occurred easily in a wider area than the damaged area of buildings. This characteristics on function of lifeline utility is not limited to only Miyagiken-Oki Earthquake. Table-2 indicates whether out of order of lifeline utilities occurred or not among earthquakes in Japan which did not give severe damage to buildings.

Function of lifeline utilities is recognized to be much weaker than strength of houses against earthquakes from the table. In order to make functional weakness of lifeline clear, the author selected only earthquakes which did not give heavy damage to houses for this table. Further, the author prepares Fig.1 to bring weakness of lifeline to earthquake into relief. Fig.1 indicates the blocked part of railroad service, area of electric power failure, and damage area of houses. It is seen that the area of functional disorder of electric power and railway is much wider than the area of houses damage, therefore, even people who lives in the region where suffered no damage with houses, could not get on the train and had no electric power.

## PROBABILITY OF FUNCTIONAL DISORDER OF LIFELINE SYSTEMS

Weakness of function of lifeline utilities during earthquakes shown previously is considered to be caused from system characteristics of "Series". For example, the author made a model for railroad as shown in Fig.2, and we can recognize a railroad without branch lines is a "Series" structure. In this case, probability of failure of total system increase exponentially according to increase of number of structural parts. For example, assume equal probability of failure of each parts  $p$ , to be 0.01, and number of connected part  $n=100$ , then, probability of functional disorder of railroad  $P_f$  is given as belows,

$$P_f = 1 - (1-p)^n = 1 - \frac{1}{2} n(n-1)p^2 + \dots \\ = 1 - (1-0.01)^{100} = 0.634$$

The value of  $p$  of 1 percent for each structural part is not so large for during earthquakes, however, the estimated results tell that railroad traffic will probably stop. And assumed number 100 is not so large. In the city of TOKYO, averaged length of a piece of underground water transmission pipe is 4m, therefore, total length of 100 pieces of water pipe is only 400m, and is not considered to have another loop line within such a short distance, so the system is of complete series.

The author considers the previously mentioned properties "Series" are why the function of lifeline was so weak in past earthquakes. Reliability characteristics variate corresponding to types of systems such as electric power, water, railroad traffic, etc.. In order to improve reliability of existing networks, it is necessary to know which is the most efficient parts to improve the total systems. For example, in the pure series structure as shown in Fig. 3 (a), reliability R of total system to vary  $P_2$  is shown in Fig. 4 (a). These figures tell us that in series network, to improve the weakest component is the most efficient and in parallel network, improvement of network components is not efficient, but to make another parallel component is an efficient way.

However, since the existing utility systems are not so simple as the above cases, the author made simple networks corresponding to each utility as shown in Figs 5-7 and estimated reliability of function of each total system by means of Monte Carlo simulation and Matrix method from the assumed probability of failure ( $P_i$ ) of the components.

After making one thousand trials of the simulation, probability of failure of the total system was obtained. And the author varied stochastic values of the system components, for example, maximum value of  $P_i$ , average value of  $P_i$ , etc., and obtained the following correlation coefficients with reliability R of total system;

- R̄ : Average value of seismic reliability R of total system,
- ZA: Correlation coefficients of R and average of probability of failure of network components  $P_i$ ,
- ZM: Correlation coefficients of R and maximum of  $P_i$ ,
- ZOI: Correlation coefficients of R and average of  $P_i$  which is larger than 0.1.
- ZN: Correlation coefficients of R and number of network components  $P_i$  of which are larger than 0.1.
- MCC: Multiple correlation coefficients of R and above mentioned various values such as averaged  $P_i$ , maximum of  $P_i$ , averaged  $P_i > 0.1$ .

The obtained results are shown in Table.3. In the table, Electric power ( + parallel ) indicates the case which have a detour route between substations in the network model of Electric power in Fig.5. From the results in Table.2, it is seen that network with many parallel routes are more reliable against earthquakes than with a few parallel routes, and the probability of failure of the weakest structure of the network has most influence on reliability of the total system in the network with few parallel routes. Therefore, the value of ZM in Table.3 could be an index indicating the characteristics of "Series" of a network system.

## QUESTIONARE SURVEY ON ASEISMICITY OF COMPUTERS IN JAPAN

A computer was subjected damage by Miyagiken-Oki earthquake of 1978. At present, computers become important center in industries, and in other fields. For example, super express train in Japan runs with help of a computer, and even TV programs are being controlled by computers. Therefore, once computers shut down during earthquake, our daly life would be affected seriously. The author made a questionare survey to 1900 enterprises in Japan, concerning what kind of consideration is paid to aseismicity of computers. The questionare has ten items;

- 1) Adrrs of location in Japan,
- 2) purpose ( Scientific Calculation, Control, Business ),
- 3) Number of floors where the computer is installed,
- 4) Whether the computer is fixed to the floor or not ?
- 5) Whether the computer has own emergency generater of electric power or not ?
- 6) And equipped with own water tank for cooling the above generater ?  
etc.

The analysed results of answers from 45% of enterprises are shown in Fig.s8-12. Computers in Japan concentrate to Tokyo, and most of them are located in the central part of the downtown the surface ground layer of which is a thick and soft alluvium deposit and considered to be bad place at the time of a future earthquake.

It is recognized from Fig.9 that many computers are installed on the top of buildings which will shake more than on the 1st floor.

Fig.10 shows that most of computers are not fixed to the floor and they might fall down or move.

Most of computers do not have own generater for electric power failure during earthquake ( Fig.11 ).

### CONCLUSION

The followings are concluded from this research.

- 1) Function of lifeline is much weaker than strength of structures. Therefore, we have to expect stoppage of electric power, water supply, railroad traffic, etc. during severe earthquake.
- 2) By means of reliability analysis of networks through Monte Carlo simulation, behaviors of lifeline networks during earthquake can be estimated qualitatively.
- 3) A usefull information to improve reliability of existing lifeline systems was obtained, however, it costs too much to improve systems not to occur any stop in lifeline function, therefore, at best improvement, necessary time to repair will be shortened.
- 4) Questionnaire survey concerning computers which come to be more important to control lifeline systems, shows that most of computers are not installed taking account of earthquake force.

REFERENCES

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


Fig.1 Damaged area of lifeline utilities in Miyagiken-Oki earthquake 1978




Fig.2 Network model for railway




Fig.3 Simple model for series and parallel structure




Fig.4 Relationship between  $R$  and  $P_2$




Fig.5 Network model for electric power system




Fig.6 Network model for telephone service




Fig.7 Network model for water transmission




Fig.8 Where are computers installed ?




Fig.9 Is the top of building the safe place for computers ?




Fig.10  
Are computers  
fixed to floor ?




Fig.11 Do computers  
have own generator  
for earthquake stoppage  
of electric power ?




Fig.12  
Whether computers  
have water tank for  
above generator ?

Damaged Facilities and Type of Damage	Number of Damage
Thermal Power Station	3
Hydroelectric Power Station	1
Substation	17
Facilities for Power Distribution	
Fall down of pole	58
Inclination of pole	387
Disconnection of High Volt. Wire	285
Disconnection of Low Volt. Wire	356
Disconnection of Incoming Line	1,063
Damage to Transformer	2583

Table.1 Damage to equipments of  
electric power system in Miyagi  
earthquake of 1978

Year of Earthquake	Damage to Building	Number of Sites	Road Traffic	Railroad Traffic	Electric Power	Water Supply	Gas Supply
1974 Low Seismic EARTH	Moderate	25	X	X	X	X	-
1975 Disaster -Chubu-	Moderate	4	X	X	X	X	-
1976 Island -Oki-	Moderate	28	X	Δ	X	X	X
1977 Hammamatsu -Oki-	Slight	8	X	X	X	X	-
1978 Gifu -Chubu-	Slight	1	X	X			
1981 Hyogo -Kansai-	Slight		○	X		○	-
1981 Kintama	Slight		X	X			

X: Function Stoppage, Δ: Partly Stoppage  
○: In Function Damage, -: In Facility  
Blank: Not Clear.

Table.2 Function disorder  
of lifeline in past earthquakes  
in Japan

	$\bar{R}$	MCC	ZA	ZM	ZOI	ZN
Water	0.80	0.57	-0.54	-0.36	-0.24	-0.46
Electric power	0.69	0.87	-0.87	-0.65	-0.48	-0.74
Electric power (Parallel)	0.79	0.75	-0.73	-0.63	-0.43	-0.62
Railroad traffic	0.73	0.81	-0.81	-0.74	-0.67	-0.71

Table.3 Correlation coefficients of reliability  
of total system and stochastic parameters of  
system components